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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Exclusion of Women
From Jury Does Not Deny Equal Protection
Defendant, a woman, was indicted for murder in Mississippi,
a state which by statute prohibits women from serving on either
grand or petit juries.1 Claiming that the total exclusion of
women from jury service denied her equal protection of the
laws as guaranteed by the feurteenth amendment, defendant
moved to quash the indictment. The motion was sustained in
the lower court. On appeal the Supreme Court of Mississippi
reversed, holding that the legislature has the power to prescribe
qualifications for jurors,2 and that a classification based on sex
is reasonable and thus does not deny the defendant equal protec-
tion of the laws.3 State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966).
Drawing from the English common law,4 the framers of
the Constitution preserved specifically the common law right to
trial by jury for all crimes triable in the federal courts.5 Since
1. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 1762 (Supp. 1964).
2. Since the Magna Charta, the legislative body has had the power
to prescribe the qualifications for jury service so as to keep the jury
abreast with the demands and conditions of the day. Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Tynan v. United States, 297 Fed. 177 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 604 (1924).
3. The court relied upon the following language in Strauder v.
West Virginia:
We do not say that within the limits from which it is not ex-
cluded by the amendment a State may not prescribe the qualifi-
cations of its jurors, and in so doing make discriminations. It
may confine the selection to males, to freeholders, to citizens,
to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational
qualifications. We do not believe the Fourteenth Amendment
was ever intended to prohibit this .... Its aim was against
discrimination because of race .
100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). Strauder held, inter alia, that discrimination
by race in the selection of jurors was a denial of equal protection of
the laws as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The dictum cited
above, however, became the cornerstone of the states' authority to ex-
clude women from the jury rolls. See, e.g., Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443 (1952); Williams v. South Carolina, 237 F. Supp. 360 (E.D.S.C. 1965);
Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 292 (1939); Commonwealth v.
Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 177 N.E. 656, cert. denied, 284 U.S. 684 (1931).
4. See FORSYTH, HISTORY or TRIAL ny JuRy (1875); Crozier, Con-
stitutionality of Discrimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U.L. REv. 722 (1935).
5. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
Although the Constitution does not command that the states adopt
trial by jury, when such an institution is adopted, its operation must be
fair and impartial within the constitutional limits. See, e.g., Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217
(1946); Patton v, United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
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the common law jury was confined to males,6 a "jury" in the
minds of the framers of the Constitution undoubtedly meant a
body of twelve men duly impaneled as the triers of fact.7 Con-
sequently, insofar as the Constitution required a trial by jury,
it did not require the seating of women thereon.
With the expansion of women's rights, many states statu-
torily departed from the traditional common law exclusion of
women from jury service.8 These enactments were upheld
despite the contention that a jury containing women violated the
constitutional right to a trial by a jury of twelve men.9 However,
the Constitution and the laws of the United States long remained
silent with respect to a woman's right to sit on a state or federal
jury, permitting women to sit as jurors only if they were so quali-
fied in the state in which the federal court sat.10 In 1957, the
Civil Rights Act conferred upon women the right to sit as jurors
in any federal court, regardless of state law." Mississippi
is the only state which now excludes women from jury service
by state law.1
2
In response to defendant's contention that she was denied
equal protection, the court in the instant case held that this
6. 3 BLACKSTONE, CowniqiTAPs 362 (6th ed. 1774). See Note,
Jury Service for Women, 12 U. FLA. L. REv. 224 (1959). In one instance
the common law apparently recognized that women were competent to
serve as jurors. The exception arose when a woman claimed pregnancy
either to establish the fact that there was an heir to the estate or to
stay execution for a capital crime until she delivered the child. Womenjurors were empaneled to resolve this issue of fact. 3 BLACKSTONE, Op.
cit. supra at 362.
7. See, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930); Capital
Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899); Diederich v. American News Co.,
128 F.2d 144 (10th Cir. 1942).
8. In some states the legislatures passed laws requiring jury duty
of women, while others merely gave them the privilege. See Hoyt v.
Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); State
v. Rosenberg, 155 Minn. 37, 192 N.W. 194 (1923). See generally Crozier,
supra note 4; Rudolph, Women on Juries-Voluntary or Compulsory, 44
J. A-m. JuD. Soc'y 206 (1960-61); Sex, Discrimination, and the Constitu-
tion, 2 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1950). In England, the Sex Disqualification
Removal Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 71, § 2, provided that all persons
qualified and liable to serve as jurors shall be summoned to serve onjuries without distinction of sex.
9. State v. Rosenberg, supra note 8; State v. Norton, 64 N.D. 675,
255 N.W. 787 (1934); State v. Chase, 106 Ore. 263, 211 Pac. 920 (1922).
10. See Wright v. United States, 165 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1948); 62
Stat. 951 (1948).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1957). See United States v. Wilson, 158 F.
Supp. 442 (M.D. Ala.), af'd, 255 F.2d 686 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 865 (1958).
12. State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966); Miss. CODE AnN.
§ 1762 (Supp. 1964).
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clause in the fourteenth amendment was intended to apply only
to instances of racial inequality.13  In addition, the court re-
jected the argument that the expansion of women's political
rights included their legal rights, stating that jury service was
not one of the privileges and immunities accorded to women as
citizens either by the Constitution or by a broad interpretation
of the nineteenth amendment.' 4 Furthermore, since the power
to establish qualifications for jurors is in the legislature of the
state, the only standard that need be observed is that any clas-
sification be reasonable.' 5 Since classification by sex was not
unreasonable in light of the legislature's determination that
women should be able to continue their service as mothers,
wives, and homemakers and be spared the "noxious atmos-
phere" of the courtroom, the court concluded that the defendant
was not deprived of her right to equal protection. 6
Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment may have been initially designed to preclude state
imposed discriminations as to race, recent applications have made
it clear that other unreasonable classifications are also pro-
13. The court relied on the reasoning used in Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1872), to the effect that the fourteenth amendment was
intended to apply only to cases of racial discrimination. Recent cases,
however, have tended to expand the amendment. See notes 17, 20 infra.
14. 187 So. 2d at 865-66. See State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 823, 185
N.W. 619 (1921); State v. Emery, 224 N.C. 581, 31 S.E.2d 858 (1944). The
instant court drew an analogy from Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162 (1874), where the Court held the right to vote was not one of
the privileges and immunities of citizenship such that the fourteenth
amendment automatically conferred upon women the right to vote.
When state statutes provide that jurors shall be selected from the
body of electors, the effect of the amendment is to enlarge the eligible
list ipso facto so as to include women. See United States v. Roemig, 52
F. Supp. 857 (1943); State v. Walker, supra; State v. Rosenberg, 155
Minn. 37, 192 N.W. 194 (1923). Contra, In re Opinion of the Justices,
237 Mass. 591, 130 N.E. 685 (1921).
15. The Constitution only requires that jury selection represent a
cross-section of those eligible for jury service within the community,
see Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1952); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128
(1940); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), not that classes
in the community be mathematically represented. See United States v.
Flynn, 106 F. Supp. 966 (1952); United States v. Foster, 83 F. Supp. 197
(1949). However, in Flynn, the court remarked that each class must be
fairly represented and that the requirements are met if the state does
not "deliberately or systematically discriminate against either sex .. .
106 F. Supp. at 980.
16. 187 So. 2d at 863. Chief Justice Ethridge, dissenting, felt the
question of whether absolute denial of the right to serve on a jury on




hibited.'7 Support for a broadened interpretation regarding
qualifications of jurors is found in Hernandez v. TexasI s in
which the Supreme Court held the equal protection clause ap-
plicable to discrimination in jury service based on nationality.
In so doing, the Court noted that it has long been recognized
that the exclusion of a class of persons from jury service on
grounds other than race or color may deprive a defendant who
is a member of that class of equal protection of the laws. 9
Significantly, a three judge court has recently held the total
exclusion of women from jury service an arbitrary classification
and therefore a denial of equal protection of the laws.20 The
court stated that:
Jury service is a form of participation in the processes of gov-
ernment, a responsibility and a right that should be shared by all
citizens, regardless of sex. The Alabama statute that denies
women the right to serve on juries in the State of Alabama
therefore violates that provision of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States that forbids any state to
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws." The plain effect of this constitutional provision is
to prohibit prejudicial disparities before the law. This means
17. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
[T]he Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political
theory of a particular era. In determining what lines are un-
constitutionally discriminatory, we have never been confined to
historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted
due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time
deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
18. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
19. Id. at 477.
20. White v. Crook, 251 F. Supp. 401 (1966). The court speaking
directly to the issue of whether the total exclusion of women from jury
service constitutes a denial of the equal protection of the laws said:
The argument that the Fourteenth Amendment was not histor-
ically intended to require the states to make women eligible forjury service reflects a misconception of the function of the
Constitution and this Court's obligation in interpreting it. The
Constitution of the United States must be read as embodying
general principles meant to govern society and the institutions
of government as they evolve through time. It is therefore this
Court's function to apply the Constitution as a living document
to the legal cases and controversies of contemporary society.
When such an application to the facts in this case is made, the
conclusion is inescapable that the complete exclusion of womenfrom jury service in Alabama is arbitrary.
Id. at 408. (Emphasis added.)
The White court distinguished Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961),
and Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947), in that those cases were
concerned with systems of jury selection under which service by women




prejudicial disparities for all citizens--including women.21
Therefore, there seems little doubt that the Constitution
proscribes sex as a basis for classification with regard to the
right of a citizen to participate in the fundamental processes of
government.22
The rationale that excluding women from jury service
permits them to continue their primary function as mothers,
wives and homemakers, and protects them from the filthy, ob-
scene, and noxious atmosphere of the courtroom does not meet
the constitutional requirement of reasonableness. That some
cases do contain a certain amount of filth and obscenity cannot
be denied, but to infer that it is so rampant in the American
courtroom that women should be totally excluded from jury
service is far from reasonable. It is absurd that a female de-
fendant can be defended by a female attorney, prosecuted by a
female prosecutor, judged by a female judge, confronted by fe-
male witnesses, all before an audience of female spectators and
yet, because women are not to be exposed to the "noxious at-
mosphere" of the courtroom, be required to have an all male
jury.
Further, the argument that women as a class are so engaged
in the needs of the home that they would be unable to perform
adequately as jurors is questionable. Only a small portion of
mothers have, at any one time, children who require constant
care, and these women could easily be excused from jury duty.
In this respect, women differ little from men who are engaged
in daily occupations.
Admitting arguendo that the exclusion of women from jury
service is a reasonable classification complying with the require-
ments of the equal protection clause, such a law may be unrea-
sonable as a violation of the defendant's rights under the due
process clause.23  The sixth and fourteenth amendments guar-
antee to all defendants the right to a trial by an impartial
jury.24 Arguably, the systematic exclusion of women from the
grand jury in Hall deprived the defendant of the impartiality
21. 251 F. Supp. 401, 408 (1966).
22. See note 11 supra. By the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat.
253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), the federal government has prohibited, with
respect to labor, discrimination based solely on sex.
23. Cf. Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1966).
24. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), have regarded separate provisions of the




guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.25  In Fay v. New
York , 26 the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of women
from jury service did not deprive the defendant of due process
of law stating that "woman jury service has not so become a part
of the textual or customary law of the land that one convicted
of crime must be set free ... if his state has lagged behind what
we personally may regard as the most desirable practice ......
However, implicit in the Court's opinion and expressly stated by
the dissenters is the idea that judgment by an impartial "cross-
section" of society cannot be obtained if women are excluded,
either by law or practice, from jury service.
Ballard v. United States, 27 decided earlier in the same term
as Fay, involved the denial of the federal statutory right of
women to serve as jurors in federal courts sitting in states which
allow women jurors. The dissenters in Fay spoke as the ma-
jority and per Justice Douglas, expressed their feeling that:
The truth is that the two sexes are not fungible; a community
made up exclusively of one is different from a community com-
posed of both; the subtle interplay of influence one on the other
is among the imponderables. To insulate the courtroom from
either may not in a given case make one iota of difference. Yet
a flavor, a distinct quality is lost if either sex is excluded. The
exclusion of one may indeed make the jury less representative of
the community than would be true if an economic or racial group
were excluded.28
Thus, in its role as trier of fact, it is highly unlikely that an all
male jury, because it lacks the experience, attitudes and values
of one-half of the community, provides the impartiality needed
to guarantee a fair trial.2 9
Moreover, the role of the jury can no longer be said to be
25. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See also Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), where the Court regarded the Illinois law
as being an unreasonable classification with regard to indigents, thus a
denial of equal protection, and a denial of due process by foreclosure
of appellate review to those who were members of the unreasonably
excluded class.
There is no expressed constitutional provision as to the classes
of persons entitled to render jury service, but the law does re-
quire that qualified persons not be excluded from jury service
on a class basis. Systematic and purposeful exclusion of quali-
fied persons cannot be reconciled with the American concept of
an impartial trial. Prejudices against certain classes tend to
affect the judgment of jurors and result in a denial to members
of such classes the full and complete enjoyment of constitutional
guarantees. ...
Billingsley v. Clayton, 359 F.2d 13, 15-16 (5th Cir. 1966).
26. 332 U.S. 261, 290 (1947).
27. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
28. Id. at 193-94.
29. See United States v. Roemig, 52 F. Supp. 857 (1943).
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solely that of trier of fact. "[T]he jury can be said to do equity,
to legislate interstitially, to implement its own norms, or to
exhibit bias. '8 0  If it be true that the jury acts to subdue the
inevitable harshness of the law and to act as a buffer between
the state and the people, then to ignore the important status of
women in society is to defeat both the jury's role as trier of fact
and as a societal check supplementing our constitutional pro-
tections.
State v. HaZl is a vestiage of the provincial attitudes which
have surrounded the inferior status of women in society. It
seems clear that systematic exclusion of women from jury serv-
ice, either by statute or by practice, creates grave constitutional
questions regarding a defendant's rights under the equal protec-
tion and due process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. The
Supreme Court has recognized the destructive effects of class
discrimination in many areas, especially when the rights of a
criminal defendant are involved. Consequently, predicting the
future demise of sex as a discriminating factor in jury service
seems clearly warranted.
Damages: Curtailment of Life Expectancy
Not Allowed as Separate Element
While aboard ship plaintiff suffered an irreversible heart
injury which shortened his life expectancy. He brought an ac-
tion under the Jones Act1 for personal injuries, contending that
the negligence of defendant's agents aggravated his heart injury
and further curtailed his life expectancy. In response to a
specially framed interrogatory, the jury returned a 25,000 dollar
special award for the further curtailment of plaintiff's life ex-
pectancy. The trial judge granted defendant's motion to modify
the verdict by eliminating this special award.2 The Third Circuit
reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of damages,
holding recovery for curtailment of life expectancy may not be
allowed as a separate element of damages, but may be included
under the usual rules of damages. Downie v. United States
Lines Co., 359 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1966).
30. KALVEN & ZEISEL, TmE Ai=RcAN JuRY 494 (1966).
1. Merchant Marine Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1964).




Although no American court, with one possible exception,3
has allowed recovery for the curtailment of life expectancy as
an independent element of damages,4 compensation for this in-
jury has been awarded under related categories. Thus, dam-
ages may be allowed for the plaintiff's fear and apprehension of
a premature death5 and an award for loss of future earnings
generally is based upon the plaintiff's life expectancy before
the injury.6 English 7 and Canadian s courts, however, have long
permitted recovery for the curtailment of life expectancy as an
independent element of damages.
A fear of speculative awards has been the most common rea-
son given by American courts for refusing to allow recovery for
3. See Sox v. United States, 187 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.S.C. 1960). An
award was given to a child who had suffered severe and permanent
prenatal injuries. The trial judge based this award on, "(a) compen-
sation for the injury and resulting impairment of mind and body ...
and (c) deprivation of normal life expectancy." Id. at 469. The trial
court in Downie discussed Sox: "There is no discussion of the ques-
tion, no citation of authority, and it is not clear whether the court re-
garded the deprivation of expectancy as a separate item of recovery, or
as merely bearing on the extent of the injury. We do not regard the
case as a trustworthy precedent." Downie v. United States Lines Co.,
supra note 2, at 196.
4. See, e.g., Farrington v. Stoddard, 115 F.2d 96 (1st Cir. 1940);
O'Leary v. United States Lines Co., 111 F. Supp. 745 (D. Mass. 1953);
Krakowski v. Aurora, E. & C.R.R., 167 Ill. App. 469 (1912); Lake Erie
& W.R.R. v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E. 732 (1922); Ramsdell v.
Grady, 97 Me. 319, 54 Atl. 763 (1903); Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167
A.2d 773 (1961); Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Au-
thority, 92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1 (1943).
5. See, e.g., Rhone v. Fisher, supra note 4; Choicener v. Walters
Amusement Agency, Inc., 269 Mass. 341, 168 N.E. 918 (1929); Ham v.
Maine-New Hampshire Bridge Authority, supra note 4. Contra, Lake
Erie & W.R.R. v. Johnson, supra note 4. See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.
2d 338 (1960). The Downie court apparently did not consider whether
plaintiff would be allowed damages for his fear and apprehension of
a premature death.
6. Prairie Creek Coal Mining Co. v. Kitnell, 106 Ark. 138, 153
S.W. 89 (1912); Borcherding v. Eklund, 156 Neb. 196, 55 N.W.2d 643
(1952); West v. Boston & M.R.R., 81 N.H. 522, 129 Atl. 768 (1925).
Contra, Hughes v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry., 150 Iowa 232, 129 N.W. 956
(1911). See generally Duffey, Life Expectancy and Loss of Earning
Capacity, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 314 (1958); Fleming, The Lost Years: A
Problem in the Computation and Distribution of Damages, 50 CAIXF. L.
REV. 598 (1962); Comment, 22 U. CmI. L. REv. 505 (1955). In the instant
case, the court would base the calculation of loss of wages upon plain-
tiff's life expectancy at the time of the injury. Downie v. United States
Lines Co., 339 F.2d 344, 347 (3d Cir. 1966).
7. See, e.g., Benham v. Gambling, [1941] A.C. 157; Rose v. Ford,
[1936] 1 K.B. 90; Flint v. Lovell, [1935] 1 K.B. 354.
8. See, e.g., Major v. Bruer, [1937] 4 D.L.R. 760; Sershall v.
Toronto Transp. Comm'n, [1938] 4 D.L.R. 369.
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the curtailment of life expectancy.9 This reasoning has been
criticized on the ground that such an award is no less speculative
than that allowed for the loss of future earnings. 0 Moreover,
the rule against speculative awards applies only to uncertainty
of causation; once the injury is shown to have resulted from the
defendant's wrong, the difficulty in ascertaining the amount of
damages should not bar recovery."
Another objection to allowing such an award is that it would
result in duplication of damages, since the jury already takes the
curtailment of the plaintiff's life expectancy into account when
assessing an award for fear and apprehension of a premature
death.' 2 It would seem, however, that this objection weighs more
heavily in favor of allowing the award. Since such combined
awards are in reality being granted, it would seem advantageous
to recognize an award for curtailment of life expectancy as an
independent element of damages, so that excessive awards under
both categories may be better controlled. 3
Although the objections that have been raised to the award
may not be persuasive, neither do the English decisions provide
a sound basis for allowing it. The English position is that one
has a right to his normal life expectancy, and an impairment of
that right requires compensation. 4 While this seems to be more
9. See, e.g., Downie v. United States Lines Co., 231 F. Supp. 192
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Lake Erie & W.R.R. v. Johnson, 191 Ind. 479, 133 N.E.
732 (1922); Ham v. Maine-New Hampshire Interstate Bridge Authority,
92 N.H. 268, 30 A.2d 1 (1943).
10. See 33 Nw. U.L. REv. 967 (1939); cf. 38 M1cH. L. REv. 97 (1939).
11. Stony Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282
U.S. 555, 562 (1931).
12. Rhone v. Fisher, 224 Md. 223, 167 A.2d 773 (1961); 13 SYacusE
L. REV. 158 (1962). English courts consider these two awards to be
conceptually independent. Thus, in Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, the
deceased never completely regained consciousness after her injury. The
trial judge refused to allow an award for curtailment of life expectancy
on the apparent assumption that the basis of the award was the victim's
fear and apprehension of a premature death. The Court of Appeals held
that the trial judge was mistaken in this view, since the award is for
an absolute loss, independent of the victim's state of mind. Rose v.
Ford, [1936] 1 K.B. 90. This view was sustained by the House of Lords
on further appeal. Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826.
13. For a similar conclusion see Smith, Psychic Interest in Contin-
uation of One's Own Life: Legal Recognition and Protection, 98 U. PA.
L. REV. 781, 795 (1950).
14. This rule was stated by Lord 'Wright, concurring in Rose v.
Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 848:
A man has a legal right that his life should not be shortened
by the tortious act of another. His normal expectancy of life
is a thing of temporal value, so that its impairment is some-
thing for which damages should be given... In one sense it
[Vol. 51:558
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of a conclusion than a justification, one commentator has found a
philosophic basis for this position,15 arguing that one's interest
in his life has a dimension of length as well as breadth:
Surely the victim suffers as real a loss in such a case [the
shortening of his life expectancy] as another sustains from a
crippling injury which narrows, without shortening, the free ex-
pression of his personality. To assess the dimensions of inter-
ests of personality we are bound by common sense to multiply
the breadth of life by its length.16
By this analogy the reduction of the plaintiff's life expectancy
correspondingly reduces the total amount of enjoyment that he
would normally derive from his existence. Thus, an award of
damages would be justified as compensation for the enjoyment
the plaintiff will lose due to his shortened life expectancy.
The court in the instant case refused to allow an award for
the curtailment of life expectancy as an independent element of
damages because of the danger of a speculative award. It would,
however, allow recovery for the loss of certain "measurable
components of injury" resulting from such curtailment, which are
to be ascertained by the usual rules of damages in tort actions. 1'7
Under these rules, recovery would be allowed for "the physical
and mental effects of the injury on his [plaintiff's] ability to
engage in those activities which normally contribute to the en-
joyment of life .... ,8s The court brought the curtailment of
is true that no money can be compensation for life or the enjoy-
ment of life, and in that sense it is impossible to fix compensa-
tion for the shortening of life. But it is the best the law can do.
It would be paradoxical if the law refused to give any compen-
sation at all because none could be adequate.
15. See Smith, supra note 13, at 788-89.
16. Id. at 789.
17. In commenting on the English rule, the court stated:
We believe that the rule is not feasible because of the incal-
culable variables which may enter into any attempt to place a
value on life; absent some workable criteria, a damage award
would be base speculation. Although we are unwilling to adopt
the per se theory it does not follow that damages for the cur-,
tailrnent of one's life expectancy, based on measurable compo-
nents of injury, are not recoverable. We believe that a fair andjust result can be achieved by resort to the rules of damages
usually applied in tort actions.
359 F.2d at 347.
18. 359 F.2d at 347. "Examples of provable elements are: inability
to dance, bowl, swim or engage in similar recreational activities; inabil-
ity to perform customary household chores; and, inability to engage in
the usual family activities." Id. at 347 n.3. Elements allowed by other
courts include loss of ability "to enter into and enjoy these boyhood
games and pastimes ... " Kasiski v. Central Jersey Power & Light
Co., 4 N.J. Misc. 130, 133, 132 Atl. 201, 202 (Sup. Ct. 1926), to play the
violin, Scally v. W. T. Garratt & Co., 11 Cal. App. 138, 104 Pac. 325
(1909), and to enjoy "the natural and ordinary uses of a healthy mind
19671
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life expectancy under this rule by classifying it as a permanent
injury. Compensation for the lost years is then to be given
by basing the award allowed by the above rule upon the plain-
tiff's normal life expectancy. It thus appears that the Downie
rule stands for two propositions: (1) the award for the plain-
tiff's loss of ability to engage in activities which are prohibited
to him during his lifetime is to be based on his normal life
expectancy; 19 and (2) the plaintiff's award for the curtailment
of his life expectancy is to be restricted to "those activities
which normally contribute to the enjoyment of life."
The result brought about by part (1) of the rule would
seem to be sound. The defendant should not be allowed to
mitigate his damages by showing that he has shortened the
plaintiff's life expectancy. Otherwise, as the Downie court noted,
the tortfeasor would be benefited at the expense of his victim. 20
The limitation in part (2) of the Downie rule distinguishes it
from the English decisions, where no attempt is made to condi-
tion the plaintiff's recovery upon the loss of his ability to engage
in certain activities. This limitation in the Downie rule has two
unfortunate effects. First, the interpretation of key words in
the rule such as "activities" and "normally" could unjustifiably
limit the plaintiff's award. The court's enumeration of certain
provable elements such as the "inability to dance, bowl, swim
or engage in similar recreational activities .... ,"21 suggests that
the word activities in the rule may be limited to those pursuits
involving physical exertion. However, since the plaintiff will be
precluded from partaking in any activities after his death, he is
no less deprived of the opportunity to follow such pursuits as
the enjoyment of fine wines, a parent's enjoyment in the up-
bringing of his children,22 contemplation of beauty, or the quiet
reflection on one's life. Therefore, there would seem to be
little justification for limiting activities to pursuits involving
physical exertion.23 The Downie rule requires that compensable
and body ... ." Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 168 Wash. 111, 115, 10 P.2d
977, 978 (1932). See also Annot., 120 A.L.R. 535 (1939).
19. It is assumed that the plaintiff's injury, in addition to curtail-
ing his life expectancy, also prohibits him from engaging in some of
his usual activities. This would seem to be the usual situation. How-
ever, if the plaintiff could prove no present disabilities, he could re-
cover only under part (2) of the rule.
20. 359 F.2d at 348.
21. Id. at 347.
22. Id. at 351 (dissenting opinion).
23. It may, of course, be easier for the plaintiff to prove his pur-
suit of physical activities, since they can be easily identified by disin-
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activities be those which normally contribute to the enjoyment
of life. Though bowling apparently meets this requirement,
one might speculate about a plaintiff who finds enjoyment in
solving complex mathematical problems. It seems clear that
this limitation would allow each plaintiff only partial recovery,
unless all his pleasures are considered normal.
Second, these limitations in the Downie rule have an addi-
tional unfortunate effect. A trial judge would have to make the
difficult decision of what activities come within the rule, re-
membering that an addition to or wrongful omission from the
undefined list of compensables would point the way for an
appeal.24
In comparison, the English courts have been more concerned
with the individual plaintiff's loss of future happiness. The
case of Benham v. Gambling25 provided several criteria by
which this loss may be measured. For example, the award is to
be measured with respect to the circumstances of the particular
plaintiff rather than judged by a presumption "that human life
is, on the whole, good."28  Naturally, activities enjoyed by the
plaintiff would be relevant in assessing the award. The problem
of speculative damages has been partially solved by reliance
upon precedent to develop standards as to what constitutes a
reasonable award. Thus, the assumption by the House of Lords
in Rose v. Ford27 that 1000 pounds is a reasonable award for
the curtailment of the life expectancy of a twenty-three year
old girl to four days has been adopted by the trial courts as the
standard for estimating awards in other cases.28 Though the
adoption of an arbitrary standard may be a tenuous solution, it
terested witnesses. Such may not be the case when subjective or seden-
tary pursuits, such as contemplation of beauty, are in issue.
24. See 359 F.2d at 351 (dissenting opinion).
25. [1941] A.C. 157.
26. Id. at 166. Several other criteria were developed in this case.
For example, the length of time that the plaintiff's life expectancy has
been shortened is relevant though not determinative, for "the thing to
be valued is not the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a
predominantly happy life." Ibid. Also, smaller awards should be given
in the case of a small child because of the greater uncertainty in his
future. For an analysis of the criteria developed in Benham v. Gam-
bling, see Smith, supra note 13, at 810-12.
27. [1937] A.C. 826. See also Benham v. Gambling, supra note 25.
28. Rose v. Ford provided a convenient measuring rod for
many harassed judges .... [I]t is to their credit that they
generally used the standard as a balance wheel for their reck-
oning, not as a substitute for independent analysis; as a ceiling
rather than as a floor.
Smith, supra note 13, at 807. But see Kahn-Freud, Expectation of Hap-
piness, 5 MODERN L. REV. 81 (1941).
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does suggest a means of assessing awards with reasonable con-
sistency.
Apparently the Downie court attempted to find a compro-
mise. It drew back somewhat from the American rule prohibiting
recovery for the curtailment of life expectancy and permitted
the plaintiff to receive partial compensation for this loss. Un-
fortunately, however, the guidelines provided by the court are
unworkable and arbitrary. If damages are to be given for the
wrongful curtailment of life expectancy, their basis should be
made as comprehensive as possible by adopting the English
method of assessing the award.
Decedent's Estates: California Law Allows
Residents of Soviet Union To Inherit
Decedents, who died domiciled in California, left real and
personal property to beneficiaries who were residents and citi-
zens of the Soviet Union. Under California law a nonresident
alien may take as a beneficiary of a California estate only upon
proof that inheritance rights are granted to American heirs of
estates in the country of the beneficiary.' The California Su-
preme Court held that inheritance rights are granted to citi-
zens of the United States by the Soviet Union and allowed the
Soviet citizens to inherit. In re Estate of Larkin, 52 Cal. Rptr.
441, 416 P.2d 473 (1966).
The California statute requiring reciprocity of inheritance
rights was first enacted in 19412 during a nation-wide movement
seeking to prevent the transfer of American estates to persons
residing in the Axis countries.3 At this time, it was widely
1. CAL. PROB. CODE § 259.2.
2. CAL. STAT. ch. 895, § 1 (1941).
3. See Chaitkin, The Rights of Residents of Russia and its Satel-
lites to Share in Estates of American Decedents, 25 So. CAL. L. REV. 297,
304 (1952); Heyman, The Nonresident Alien's Right to Succession Under
the "Iron Curtain Rule", 52 Nw. U.L. REV. 221, 226-31 (1958).
Several states enacted statutes similar in substance to the California
statute. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 567.8 (Supp. 1964); MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 91-520 (1964); OtLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 121 (1966); ORE. REV.
STAT. § 111.070(1) (a) (Supp. 1957). Other states enacted statutes re-
quiring the nonresident alien to show that he would have the use,
benefit and control of all property sent to him. See, e.g., MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 206, § 27A (Supp. 1964); Mc. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (306a)
(Supp. 1959); N.J. REV. STAT. 3A:25-10 (1953); N.Y. Sum CT. ACT
§ 269-a.
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feared that property passing to such persons would be confis-
cated by one of the totalitarian governments, and used against
American interests.4 State legislators were also motivated by
the refusal of the German government to allow citizens of the
United States to take as beneficiaries of German estates.5
Upon the elimination of the threat of confiscation by a hos-
tile German government in 1945, the California statute was
amended to place the burden of establishing a lack of reciprocity
on the person challenging the right of the nonresident alien to
inherit.6 The purpose of the amendment was to relieve the
hardship caused by withholding badly needed funds from resi-
dents of defeated and occupied countries.7 However, in 1947,
the California legislature repealed the 1945 statute and enacted
a statute essentially identical to the 1941 legislation.8
Under the present statute, the California courts have usually
found that the Soviet Union and other communist countries do
not grant reciprocityY These decisions have been premised
upon a dislike of the Communist legal and judicial system, the
existence of laws discriminating against aliens, and the lack of
understandable inheritance laws.10 The fear has also been ex-
pressed that estates sent to communist countries may be confis-
cated, the property used to the disadvantage of the United States,
and the testator's intentions frustrated."
4. See Chaitkin, supra note 3, at 304; Heyman, supra note 3, at
226-31. See also CAL. STAT. ch. 895, § 2 (1941).
5. See Heyman, supra note 3, at 226.
6. CAL. STAT. ch. 1160, § 1 (1945).
7. See Chaitkin, supra note 3, at 308.
8. CAL. STAT. ch. 1042 (1947). Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947),
which held the 1941 statute constitutional, was undoubtably a substantial
cause of the re-enactment of the earlier legislation. See Chaitkin, supra
note 3, at 309; Heyman, supra note 3, at 231.
9. See, e.g., Estate of Arbulich, 41 Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); In re Estate of Larkin, 44 Cal. Rptr. 731(Dist. Ct. App. 1965); In re Eng's Estate, 228 Cal. App. 2d 160, 39 Cal.
Rptr. 254 (1964). Some lower courts, however, have permitted distribu-
tion to Soviet citizens. See Berman, Soviet Heirs in American Courts,
62 CoLum. L. REv. 225, n.1 (1962).
Courts in states requiring a showing that the nonresident alien
beneficiary will be entitled to the use, benefit, and control of the prop-
erty have also denied distribution to Soviet beneficiaries. See, e.g.,
Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d 740 (1963); Matter of Wells,
204 Misc. 975, 126 N.Y.S.2d 441 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
10. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gogabashvele, 195 Cal. App. 2d 503,
16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961). See also Matter of Getream, 200 Misc. 543, 107
N.Y.S.2d 225 (Surr. Ct. 1951); Belemecich Estate, 411 Pa. 506, 192 A.2d
740 (1963); Zupko Estate, 9 Fiduc. Rep. 78 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1959).
11. See note 10 supra; Heyman, supra note 3, at 230.
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The Larkin court construed the California statute to require
"no more than a demonstration that the law of the foreign
country, as written and consistently applied in practice, enables
our citizens to inherit economically significant property interests
on terms of full equality with the residents of that country."' 2
In finding that Soviet law satisfied this requirement, the court
relied upon the testimony of Russian and American experts on
Soviet law in the trial record. Each of these experts testified
that the applicable provision of Soviet law,13 though ambiguous
in its language, is interpreted by Soviet legal authorities as con-
ferring upon aliens the same civil rights, including the right of
inheritance, as are enjoyed by Soviet citizens.14 The court's
conclusion was further supported by the testimony of seven
persons who had received property from Soviet estates' 5 and
by several Soviet court cases recognizing the inheritance rights
of aliens.' 6
The Attorney General 7 argued that the policy of the statute
precluded granting inheritance rights to residents of countries
having a governmental structure and foreign policy such as that
presently maintained by the Soviet Union. Based on the hold-
ing in Clark v. Allen' s that state regulation of the devolution
of decedents' estates to foreign heirs can invade the exclusive
power of the federal government in the area of foreign rela-
tions,19 and state legislation governing inheritance rights is
valid only if its effect on foreign relations is indirect and inci-
dental,20 the Larkin court felt precluded from basing construc-
12. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 444, 416 P.2d at 476.
13. R.S.F.S.R. CivrL CODE art. 8 (1922) (U.S.S.R.).
14. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 445-50, 416 P.2d at 477-82. The court noted
this grant of civil equality was clearly spelled out in the recodification
of Soviet law which became effective in 1962: "Foreign citizens enjoy
the same civil capacity as Soviet citizens. Special exceptions may be
established by the laws of the U.S.S.R." Principles of Civil Law of the
U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics § 122 (1961). See Ginsburgs, Inheri-
tance by Foreigners Under Soviet Law, 51 IowA L. REv. 16, 70-73 (1965).
15. See 52 Cal. Rptr. at 452-53, 416 P.2d at 484-85.
16. Motsarsky v. L~onite, Supreme Court of the Lithuanian S.S.R.,
1958, 87 JOURNAL Du DRoIT INTERNATIoNAL, 858, 863 (U.S.S.R. 1960);
Sikora v. Cherkaskina, 1957 Byulleten "Verkhovnogo Suda S.S.S.R. 42
(Presidium of the Supreme Court of Byelorussian S.S.R.).
17. Since the result of a finding that the Russian beneficiaries
could not take would have been escheat to the state, the State of Cal-
ifornia was a party to the action.
18. 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
19. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936); U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 8, 10; art. I, § 2.
20. Compare Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), with Ioannou v.
New York, 371 U.S. 30 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
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tion of the statute on foreign policy considerations. The court
found that such a construction would involve more than an in-
cidental invasion of the foreign relations power of the federal
government and would endanger the constitutionality of the
statute.
21
The policy of the federal government regarding inheritance
by the citizens and residents of communist countries has never
been made clear. In reply to the requests of state courts for a
statement of federal policy in this area, the State Department
has uniformly maintained that the regulation of inheritance
rights is a matter within the exclusive control of the states.22
However, these State Department replies always cite a treasury
regulation prohibiting the sending of government checks to cer-
tain communist countries23 and several state court decisions which
have relied on the regulation in denying distribution to residents
of communist countries.2 4  In addition, the United States has
refused a Soviet request that an agreement on inheritance rights
be negotiated, asserting the matter to be within state jurisdic-
tion,2r although it has entered into several treaties with other
countries which contain provisions regulating inheritance rights.2 6
Thus, while the ostensible policy of the federal government re-
garding inheritance by Soviet citizens appears to be one of
official neutrality, the State Department replies encourage the
states to deny distribution to Soviet citizens.
It was probably the intent of the California legislators that
residents of communist countries should not take as beneficiar-
21. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 456, 416 P.2d at 488.
22. See In re Estate of Feierman, 202 Cal. App. 2d 552, 20 Cal. Rptr.
883 (1962); Bader, Brown & Grzybowski, Soviet Inheritance Cases in
American Courts and the Soviet Property Regime, 1966 DUKE L.J. 98,
103, n.31; Berman, supra note 9, at 273, n.43.
23. Treas. Reg. § 211.2(a) (1966).
24. These decisions usually rely on the federal government's super-
ior fact finding ability as to the conditions in communist countries. See,
e.g., In re Estate of Feierman, 202 Cal. App. 2d 552, 20 Cal. Rptr. 883.
(1962); Matter of Braier, 305 N.Y. 148, 111 N.E.2d 424, appeal dismissed
sub nom., Kalmane v. Green, 346 U.S. 802 (1953); Matter of Offinger, 28
Misc. 2d 633, 215 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Surr. Ct. 1961).
25. N.Y. Times, June 2, 1964, p. 3, col. 5 (city ed.). See also Gins-
burgs, supra note 14, at 73.
26. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights
with Hungary, June 24, 1925, 44 Stat. 2441, T.S. No. 748; Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, Dec. 8, 1923,
44 Stat. 2132, T.S. No. 725; Treaty Relating to the Tenure and Disposition
of Real and Personal Property with Great Britain, March 2, 1899, 31
Stat. 1939, T.S. No. 146. See also Boyd, Treaties Governing the Succes-
sion to Real Property by Aliens, 51 MxtcH. L. REV. 1001 (1953).
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ies of California estates.27 In observing this unwritten objec-
tive, the California courts prior to Larkin served the apparent
policy of the federal government by discouraging distribution
to residents of communist countries without officially taking
any action which would imperil hopes for a cold war thaw.28
As a matter of statutory construction and application, the
correctness of the Larkin decision cannot be denied. The test
established by the statute is clear: is there reciprocity of in-
heritance rights? The evidence presented by the beneficiaries
proved that Soviet law grants reciprocal inheritance rights to
American citizens. The prior California decisions which had
looked to communist policies and governmental structure intro-
duced factors having no relevance to the unambiguous statutory
mandate. By looking to the evidence in an unbiased manner,
the Larkin court avoided all irrelevancies and reached the con-
clusion required by the statute.
In recent years, several state courts have allowed distribu-
tion to heirs residing in the satellite countries. 29 The Larkin
decision has extended this trend to encompass Soviet citizens.
If the policy of the federal government is to prevent distribution
of decedents' estates to heirs residing in communist countries,
a firmer and more public stand is necessary to implement that
policy. However, the delicacies of international relations make
such an open declaration of policy unlikely.
Estate Planning: Fixed Income Provision
Disqualifies Marital Trust
Decedent's will established a residuary trust which gave his
widow a life interest and a general. testamentary power of ap-
27. See Heyman, supra note 3, at 231. See also 35 MAss. L.Q. 34
(1950).
28. See, e.g., Estate of Arbulich, 41. Cal. 2d 86, 257 P.2d 433, cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 897 (1953); In Te Gogabashvele's Estate, 195 Cal. App.
2d 503, 16 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1961).
29. See, e.g., In the Matter of Estate of Hosva, 143 Mont. 74, 387
P.2d 305 (1963) (Czechoslovakia); In the Matter of Estate of Gaspar,
128 Mont. 383, 275 P.2d 656 (1954) (Rumania); Matter of Tybus, 28
Misc. 2d 278, 217 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Surr. Ct. 1961) (Poland); Matter of
Offinger, 28 Misc. 2d 633, 215 N.Y.S.2d 642 (Surr. Ct. 1961) (Yugoslavia);
In the Matter of Estate of Kasendorf, 222 Ore. 463, 353 P.2d 531 (1960)(Estonia); Sutkowski Estate, 10 Fiduc. Rep. 498 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. 1960)(Poland); Aras Estate, 16 Pa. D. & C. 2d 635 (Orphans' Ct. 1959) (Yu-
goslavia). See also Bader, Brown & Grzybowski, supra note 22, at 104.
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pointment over the corpus. It directed the trustee to pay her a
fixed monthly stipend' from the income, and from the corpus
if necessary, for the duration of her life. The Internal Revenue
Service denied the executor's claim for a marital deduction on
that portion of the corpus which would yield the monthly sti-
pend, as calculated by annuity tables.2 In an action for refund
of the resulting estate taxes, the district court held for the
executor.3 On appeal the Third Circuit denied the marital de-
duction, holding that unpredictable market conditions made the
use of fixed interest rates unfeasible for estimating the amount
of corpus necessary to supply a fixed trust income. The widow
might not always be entitled to all the income from a specific
portion of the trust, contrary to the requirements of Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, § 2056 (b) (5), 4 since the fixed income
provision would deny distribution of part of the income if in-
terest rates rose. Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 476 (3d Cir. 1966).
The marital deduction was created by the Internal Revenue
Act of 19485 in response to widespread dissatisfaction with prior
law.6 Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, a decedent's
entire estate was taxed in common law states, while in com-
munity property states one half of the estate passed untaxed to
the surviving spouse as that spouse's share of the community
property. Congress attempted to remedy this inequality by in-
cluding community property within the estate tax exactions of
the 1942 act;7 but this patchwork amendment caused serious
hardships in community property states,8 and it became evi-
l. The widow was to receive $300 per month until testator's
youngest child reached eighteen and thereafter $350 per month for the
rest of her life.
2. The formula was that used by the Treasury Department in
valuation of annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders, and re-
versions. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7, -8 (1958).
3. Northeastern Pa. Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 235
F. Supp. 941 (M.D. Pa. 1964).
4. Section 2056(b) (5) provides a qualified exception to the ter-
minable interest rule of § 2056(b) (1) as follows:(5) Life estate with power of appointment in surviving spouse.
In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent,
if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from
the entire interest, or all the income from a specific portion
thereof, payable annually or at more frequent intervals, with
power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire interest, or
such specific portion .... (Emphasis added.)
5. Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 351(a), 62 Stat. 116.
6. See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
7. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 402(b) (1) (e) (2), 56 Stat. 942.
8. See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
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dent that a new theoretical approach was needed.9 In conse-
quence, Congress designed the marital deduction to equalize the
geographic impact of the estate tax and to eliminate difficulties
incident to the prior provisions. The 1948 act returned com-
munity property states to their pre-1942 position'0 and, in all
other states, allowed half the estate to pass untaxed to the sur-
viving spouse, thereby postponing taxation of that portion until
the survivor's death. The marital deduction trust qualifying
under section 2056(b) (5) quickly became a popular form of mari-
tal deduction gift." As litigation occurred over the technical re-
quirements of the section, the marital deduction trust encoun-
tered rigid interpretation by the courts.' 2  Thus, it was held
that the surviving spouse was entitled to the deduction only if
she received all income from the entire trust. 3 The Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 liberalized this requirement by providing
for a marital deduction where the surviving spouse received all
income from a specific portion of a trust. But treasury regula-
tions' 4 restrictively construed "specific portion" to mean either
a fractional or percentile share.
In 1962, Gelb v. Commissioner15 allowed a marital deduction
where the surviving spouse had a power of appointment over
the corpus of a trust, less a specific dollar portion thereof. In
that case a widow was entitled to all the income from a residuary
trust and had a power of appointment over the corpus, subject to
a power in the trustee to invade corpus for another beneficiary
up to 5,000 dollars per year. The court indirectly calculated the
specific portion over which she alone had a power of appointment
by determining the maximum amount of corpus which could be
diverted to the other's use. The present value of 5,000 dollars
was multiplied by the second beneficiary's life expectancy, as
9. See ibid.
10. The 1948 act repealed those sections of the 1942 act which in-
cluded community property within the estate tax provisions.
11. LOWNDES & KRAmER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAxEs ch. 17
(2d ed. 1962).
12. Allen L. Weisberger, 29 T.C. 217 (1957) noted that "deductions
are a matter of legislative grace, and the taxpayer seeking the benefit
of a deduction must show that every condition which Congress has seen
fit to impose has been fully satisfied." See Anderson, The Marital De-
duction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Be-
tween Common Law and Community Property States, 54 MIcH. L. REv.
1087, 1111 (1956).
13. E.g., Esther Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185 (1954), ajfd per curiam,
223 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1955).
14. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5 (1958).
15. 298 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1962).
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computed from mortality tables, and that product was subtracted
from the corpus. The widow's share thus represented the en-
tire corpus less a sum estimated by actuarial computation. The
court held that this share qualified for the deduction. In so
doing it disapproved Treasury Regulation 20.2056(b)-5(c) in-
sofar as it limited a qualifying specific portion to a fractional or
percentile share, noting that neither section 2056(b) (5) nor its
legislative history"6 required such a construction.'7
On facts similar to those of the instant case, the Seventh
Circuit, in Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. United States,18
relied upon Gelb to approve a marital deduction wherein an-
nuity tables were used to calculate the specific dollar portion of
a trust corpus necessary to yield 200 dollars per month at 31/2
per cent interest for the rest of the surviving spouse's life.
Conceding that a dollar amount might qualify as a specific por-
tion, 19 the Commissioner argued that selection of a fixed in-
terest rate to calculate a static corpus income in the future was
inappropriate, since interest rate fluctuation makes it impossible
to predict a constant yield. The income of a sum so determined
therefore would not meet the requirement that the spouse be
entitled to all the income. 20 The court interpreted Gelb to have
inferentially approved actuarially computed specific portions2 '
and held the underlying principles of that case to be control-
ling.22
16. But see H.R. ReP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. REP.
No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954); S. RE. No. 1983, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1958), which gives only fractional or percentile examples of a
specific portion.
17. See 16 VAND. L. REV. 261 (1962) (argument that specific portion
cannot be a dollar amount).
18. 359 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1966).
19. Id. at 820, n.8.
20. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2056(b) (1), known as the terminable
interest rule, provides in part: "(1) General Rule.-Where, on the lapse
of time, on the occurence of an event or contingency, or on the failure
of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the surviving
spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed .... " In
the instant case decedent's will left a remainder in default of the widow's
exercise of the power of appointment, thus making the trust provisions
a terminable interest under the rule. Consequently, if the trust provisions
did not fall within § 2056(b) (5), which is a qualified exception to §
2056(b) (1), the latter section would disallow a marital deduction for
the trust.
21. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. United States, 359 F.2d 817,
820 n.11 (7th Cir. 1966).
22. Citizens Nat'l Bank of Evansville v. United States, supra at 821.
Since Gelb involved the "specific portion" requirement of § 2056(b) (5),
the language pertaining to the actuarially computed present value of
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The majority in the instant case, however, found the Com-
missioner's argument in Citizens persuasive. It observed that
improving market conditions would cause income in excess of
the stipend to be accumulated and concluded this fact disqual-
ified the deduction, since in the future the widow might not be
entitled to all the income from a specific portion.23 The ma-
jority distinguished Gelb, declaring the issue in that case to be
the "specific portion" requirement, as opposed to the "all the
income" requirement presently before the court.24
The issues raised by Citizens and the instant case pose the
general question: when can computations which involve interest
rates appropriately be used to determine the terms of a trust
which will qualify under section 2056(b) (5) as an exception to
the terminable interest rule? Clearly, the results of such com-
putations must meet two tests: the spouse's interest must be a
specific portion of the corpus; and the spouse must be entitled to
all the income from that portion. If it is allowed that the sum
determined in Gelb was a specific portion, Gelb's use of interest
rates satisfied both requirements, since the spouse was there en-
titled to all the income, however much it might fluctuate.
Citizens, however, found inferential authority in the Gelb meth-
od of calculation to use actuarial tables to determine what income
the widow would receive from a trust. This extension of the
Gelb principle is permissible only if the result falls within the
statutory limits of the second requirement. If the words "all the
$5,000 would appear to be dicta. It is not clear that the negative use of
actuarial computation to determine a sum which will be subtracted from
a trust corpus represents authority for the positive use of such calcula-
tions to determine a sum which must meet the requirements of § 2056
(b) (5).
23. The dissent argued that the effect of future market fluctuation
on income should not be considered, relying on Jackson v. United States,
376 U.S. 503 (1964), which held the deduction must be determined at
the time of decedent's death. However, Jackson involved a widow's
allowance subject to termination on her death or remarriage. The Court
held it improper to wait to see whether the interest was in fact defeased
in order to include it within a marital deduction. Arguably, this under-
mines the dissent, since the majority in the instant case did not contend
the deduction should await an examination of future market conditions.
Just as the possibility that the spouse will remarry or die in Jackson
existed at decedent's death, so did the possibility of market fluctuation
in the instant case. Thus the terminable interest rule should disqualify
both deductions. See note 20 supra.
24. See 363 F.2d at 483, 484. The court added: "Under the facts
of Gelb only the life expectancies were subject to variation." Id. at 483.
This would appear to be incorrect, in view of the fact that the present
valuation of the $5000 by definition includes interest rate calculations.
Gelb v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 544, 551 (2d Cir. 1962).
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income" contain no flexibility, the possibility that income might
have to be accumulated will disallow the deduction. 25
Because ambiguous, treasury regulations construing the
right to income qualification provide little aid in framing the
proper interpretation. Treasury Regulation § 20.2056 (b)-5 (f) (1)
states that the requirement is met if:
[T]he effect of the trust is to give her [spouse-beneficiary] sub-
stantially that degree of beneficial enjoyment of the trust prop-
erty during her life which the principles of the law of trusts
accord to a person who is unqualifiedly designated as the life
beneficiary of a trust.
If it can be demonstrated empirically that a life beneficiary
normally receives a yield of between three and four per cent,
arguably a marital deduction trust structured to produce a fixed
income of 3Y per cent should be allowed as providing the sur-
viving spouse with substantially that degree of enjoyment of
the trust property which a life beneficiary receives.26 Under
this approach, however, the possibility of income accumulation
remains. Treasury Regulation § 20.2056(b)-5(f)(7), declares,
"An interest passing in trust fails to satisfy the condition ...
to the extent that the income is required to be accumulated in
whole or in part ......
This requirement 27 parallels similar language from a Sen-
25. This conclusion does not follow necessarily from the presence
of interest rates in the method of computation. If an absolute ceiling
could be determined for income, for example by a statute preventing
trust investments from receiving more than 3 per cent regardless of
the market, a sum could be calculated from which it would be impos-
sible for the income to exceed a fixed amount, thus preventing the
possibility of accumulation. The instant case recognized this fact:
It should be noted in passing that it would be unrealistic to
conceive of an unlimited income potential from a trust whose
trustees, by law, must stay within the bounds of certain guide
lines. Such a consideration may play a part in another case at
another time. Here, however, appellee . . . [can] invest the
corpus to produce an income in excess of the monthly stipend.
Northeastern Pa. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 363 F.2d at
481, n.13 (1966).
26. "Presumably, specific portion does not mean anything more
than a designation of the amount of the surviving spouse's interest
which makes it feasible to compute the amount of the marital deduc-
tion." LowNDEs & KRAMER, Op. cit. supra note 11, at 407.
27. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-5(f) (5) (1958) contains an analogous
provision:
An interest passing in trust will not satisfy the condition ...[that the beneficiary be entitled to all the income] if the pri-
mary purpose of the trust is to safeguard property without
providing the spouse with the required beneficial enjoyment.
Such trusts include not only trusts which expressly provide for
the accumulation of the income but also trusts which indirectly
accomplish a similar purpose.
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ate report 2s which explained in detail the provisions of section
2056 (b) (5), "The surviving spouse must be entitled to the income
from the corpus annually, or at more frequent intervals. This
requirement disqualifies any trust the income of which is re-
quired to be accumulated ...
Thus, since the treasury regulations would seem to demand
a strict construction of the right to income provision, especially
with respect to possible income accumulation, the above "em-
pirical" approach is not likely to meet with judicial favor.
Nevertheless, the Citizens court purported to give section
2056(b) (5) a liberal construction, in the belief that such an ap-
proach was most in accord with a congressional intent to equalize
the geographic effect of the estate tax.29 It must be noted,
however, that the marital deduction was created as a means to
that goal, and not as an end in itself. Little in the legislative
history3" of the marital deduction points to a liberal intent in
the sense of giving common law jurisdictions a gratuitous tax
benefit.31 To the contrary, Congress first tried to establish geo-
graphic equality in 1942 by taxation of community property.
Only in the face of serious administrative and other difficulties
six years later did Congress subordinate its revenue interest to
the elimination of such problems. Further, there are a great
many areas where, in practice, the marital deduction itself has
caused inequalities.32  Absent legislative efforts to readjust
28. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
29. Citizens cited Dougherty v. United States, 292 F.2d 331, 337 (6th
Cir. 1961), and United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963) for the
following proposition:
The purpose of the marital deduction provision was to extend
to spouses in common law states the advantages of married
taxpayers in community property states, by permitting the
surviving spouse to acquire free of estate tax up to one half of
the decedent's adjusted gross estate . . . and to bring about a
two-stage payment of estate taxes ....
30. See S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
31. The argument has been advanced that since both spouses con-
tribute equally to a marriage, though in different ways, it is a harsh
rule which denies to a surviving spouse, especially a widow, that portion
of the total which she helped accumulate, simply because title is not
in her name. Anderson, supra note 12, at 1132.
32. A senate report noted that the marital deduction was not a
panacea:
It is recognized that complete equalization of the estate and
gift taxes can not be achieved because of the inherent differ-
ences between community property and noncommunity prop-
erty. However, the new provisions will result in equality in
the important situations.
S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948). However, one commentator
has suggested that even this assessment was optimistic: "Only in the
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these disparities,33 it is not at all clear that congressional intent
requires the judiciary to override the plain meaning of "all the
income from a specific portion" in the taxpayers' favor.
Evidence: Waiver of Physician-
Patient Privilege
In an action for personal injuries defendants attempted to
depose plaintiff's physician to obtain information concerning the
alleged injuries. Plaintiff's attorney advised the physician that
such information was privileged and instructed him not to tes-
tify. Failing to acquire the needed information, defendants ap-
plied for an order requiring the physician to testify on pretrial
depositions. The lower court denied the motion. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Alaska reversed, holding that by commencing
a personal injury action plaintiff waived the physician-patient
privilege to the extent that his physician could be required to
testify on pretrial depositions as to the injuries alleged. Mathis
v. Hilderbrand, 416 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1966).
Although the physician-patient privilege has never been
recognized under the common law,' the majority of states have
created the privilege by statute.2  Unlike attorney-client and
priest-penitent privileges, which have a common law origin,8 the
scope of protection of the physician-patient privilege,4 the in-
'classic case,' that is, where the husband owns all the property at com-
mon law and he dies first, is equalization achieved; in the other situa-
tions postulated, substantial inequality exists between the two property
systems." Anderson, supra note 12, at 1099.
33. Several commentators have suggested that deductions be deter-
mined as a function of the total estate of both spouses. Anderson, supra
note 12, at 1133; Sugarman, Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The Mar-
ital Deduction, 36 CALiF. L. REV. 223, 280 (1948).
1. R. v. Duchess of Kingston, 20 How. St. Trials 355 (H.L. 1776);
Wilson v. Rastall, 4 T.R. 753, 100 Eng. Rep. 1283 (K.B. 1792).
2. For a list of states which recognize the physician-patient priv-
ilege and for the statutes involved, see 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 2380 n.5
(McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
3. See Dennis v. Codrington, Cary 143, 21 Eng. Rep. 53 (Ch. 1580);
Berd v. Lovelace, Cary 88, 21 Eng. Rep. 33 (Ch. 1577); Broad v. Pitt,
3 Car. & P. 518, 172 Eng. Rep. 528 (1828). These privileges are now
codified in most states. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.241(1) (1965); Wis. STAT.
§ 885.20 (1965).
4. The statutes only protect a patient from disclosure of informa-
tion in judicial proceedings. Also, the statutes do not protect those
patients most concerned with keeping the information confidential.
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formation protected,5 the actions in which the privilege may be
invoked,6 and the manner in which the privilege may be waived 7
depend upon the judgment of the legislature. The statutes allow
the communicant patient to prohibit his physician from reveal-
ing, in a judicial proceeding, confidential information obtained
during the professional relationship." The privilege is based
upon the belief that the harm caused by the disclosure of such
information outweighs the good derived from the unhindered
pursuit of fTuth.9
As with other privileges, the physician-patient privilege may
Many states require the physicians to report gun shot wounds, abortions,
and the presence of certain diseases. Such information may lead to
criminal prosecution, investigation by the health department into a pa-
tient's sexual activity, or long quarantine periods. However, the prac-
titioner often refuses to make a positive diagnosis of these maladies and
consequently does not file a report.
5. The statutes typically protect only that information which is
necessary to the physician for diagnosis or treatment. State v. Emerson,
266 Minn. 217, 123 N.W.2d 382 (1963). However, because courts are
reluctant to decide what information fulfills this requirement, they
include all information which the physician acquires in a confidential
setting and which is not equally available to a layman. See DEWITT,
PRIVILEGED COMMUNIcATIONS BETWEEN PHYsIcIAN AND PATIENT 145-76
(1958) [hereinafter cited as DEWITT].
6. Since an action under a workmen's compensation statute is not
a true adversary proceeding, several states have provided that common
law and statutory rules of evidence do not apply. Many states require
examination by a physician but limit testimony of a patient's attending
physician to information subsequent to the injury. Such testimony does
not waive the privilege as to other proceedings. Other actions in which
the physician-patient privilege is inapplicable include actions for mal-
practice, wrongful death, personal injury, and for the recovery of insur-
ance benefits. See generally DEWITT 235-65.
7. In New York waiver must take place in court. See DEWrT
347. In Michigan and Minnesota anticipatory waiver is ineffectual in
an action to recover insurance benefits. See DEWITT 351-52.
8. E.g., N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAw § 4504(a); UTAH CODE ANN. 78-24-8
(4) (1953).
9. See Arizona & N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669, 677 (1915);
McCoRVIcK, EVIDENCE § 108 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMwcx].
It has never been entirely clear why New York broke with tradition,
becoming the first state to recognize the privilege. N.Y. REV. STAT. H,
406 (1829). The Report of the Revisers, N.Y. STAT. 111, 737 (1836), indi-
cates that the revisers were influenced by the necessity of full disclosure
for adequate treatment, the fear that an individual would not consult a
physician if there was no privilege, and the argument that physicians'
professional honor would lead to concealment or perversion of truth.
The multitude of statutes in the 1828 code pertaining to the reporting of
epidemic diseases demonstrates the revisers' concern with public health.
The revisers may have created the privilege in an attempt to protect




be expressly 10 or impliedly waived.'" Regarding waivers,
three options are available to a plaintiff. First, he may refuse to
waive the privilege, thus denying the defendant access to priv-
ileged information. However, he thereby limits himself to gen-
eral statements about his medical condition, 12 and may also
expose himself to adverse comment concerning his reluctance to
have this information revealed in court.'3 Secondly, plaintiff
may partially waive the privilege 4 early in the pretrial pe-
riod. By exposing this information to defendant's depositions,
plaintiff gains the use of this information at trial without further
waiver and insulates himself from adverse comment. Finally,
plaintiff may waive the privilege either immediately before or at
trial. He thereby prevents the defendant from making effective
use of this information, 5 while fully utilizing this information
for his own purposes.'6
It is obviously inequitable to allow the plaintiff the tactical
advantage resulting from late waiver. Several states have cor-
rected this situation by legislation providing that the commence-
10. E.g., Allen v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 149 Neb. 233, 30
N.W.2d 885 (1948); Hassing v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 108 Utah 198, 159
P.2d 117 (1945).
11. E.g., Clifford v. Denver & R.G.R.R., 188 N.Y. 349, 80 N.E. 1094
(1907); McKinney v. Grand Street, P.P. & F.R.R., 104 N.Y. 352, 10 N.E.
544 (1887).
Although it would appear that any revelation of privileged infor-
mation would destroy the purpose of the privilege, courts have held
that the information must be revealed in a judicial proceeding before
the privilege is waived. Polish Roman Catholic Union of America v.
Palen, 302 Mich. 557, 5 N.W.2d 463 (1942). The information must also
be revealed voluntarily or without the compulsion of the judicial proc-
ess. See Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954);
Harpman v. Devine, 133 Ohio St. 1, 10 N.E.2d 776 (1937). Hence, if the
party opponent reveals privileged information, either on deposition or on
cross-examination, and the privilege is asserted, the privilege has not
been waived. Briggs v. Chicago Great W. Ry., 248 Minn. 418, 80 N.W.2d
625 (1957).
12. See DEW'rT 409-10; McCovxcK § 106; 8 WIGMORE § 2389.
13. Nelson v. Ackermann, 249 Minn. 582, 83 N.W.2d 500 (1957).
However, the courts are hopelessly divided upon this issue. See Annot.,
116 A.L.R. 1170 (1938). In some jurisdictions it is possible for the de-
fendant to force the plaintiff to assert the privilege in front of the jury.
See Annot., 144 A.L.R. 1007 (1943).
14. See authorities cited supra note 11; DEWrrr 396-97.
15. In Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., 12 App. Div. 2d 44, 48, 208
N.Y.S.2d 285, 290 (1960), the court, in dictum, stated that when the
plaintiff, by asserting the privilege, denied the defendant access to med-
ical information and then presented this information at trial, the infor-
mation would come as surprise evidence, necessitating a continuance
and possibly a mistrial.
16. Dubois v. Clark, 253 Minn. 556, 93 N.W.2d 533 (1958).
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ment of an action for personal injuries constitutes waiver.1'7
In other states, use of pretrial conferences offers a solution.
Here a judge may limit the scope of injuries to be alleged and
evidence to be presented.' 8 The judge may also use this
opportunity to order plaintiff to waive the physician-patient
privilege as to any information to be presented at trial.19
Courts unwilling to use the pretrial conference have implied
a waiver of the privilege predicated upon the bringing of suit.
However, they have differed as to the standards used in deter-
mining whether waiver is required, the time at which such a
determination must be made, and the effect of such a deter-
minatioix.
Some courts will not allow a case to be placed upon the
trial calendar until the privilege has been waived. In Kriger
v. Holland Furnace Co., 20 a personal injury action, plaintiff
asserted the privilege to frustrate the defendant's attempts to
depose her physician, although she admitted that the privilege
would have to be waived at trial. The court held that the
privilege did give her the absolute right to privacy, but since
she was unwilling to disclose information which must eventually
be revealed, she could not force the court to proceed to trial.
Other courts maintain that plaintiff must produce during the
pretrial period evidence which he in good faith contemplates
will not be protected at trial. This was the holding in Mariner
v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co.,2 1 wherein the court found
17. E.g., CAL. Crv. PROc. CODE § 1881, which provides:
That where any person brings an action to recover damages
for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute
a consent by the person bringing such action that any physician
who has prescribed for or treated said person and whose testi-
mony is material in said action shall testify....
NEv. REV. STAT. § 48.080(4) (1963) is virtually identical. Minnesota is
considering a broader statute which would provide for waiver of the
physician-patient privilege in any action in which the plaintiff volun-
tarily put his physical, mental, or blood condition at issue.
18. See ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16, which is similar to FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
19. See Dubois v. Clark, 253 Minn. 556, 560 n.1, 93 N.W.2d 533, 536
n.1 (1958), where the court said that the pretrial conference could be
used to determine the scope of waiver. 1A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 473 (Wright ed. 1960), takes the position that
courts may be less liberal in allowing amendments of the pretrial order
to enlarge the permissible scope of evidence. See also 60 YAL.E L.J. 175
(1951).
20. 12 App. Div. 2d 44, 208 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1960). Accord, Awtry
v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
21. 202 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ohio 1962). It is interesting to note the
similarity of reasoning and language in Mariner and the instant case
and the dissimilarity in their holdings. In Greene v. Sears, Roebuck &
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that defendant should have information during the pretrial pro-
ceedings which he probably would have at trial.
Similarly, in the instant case the decision rests upon the
assumptions that the privilege invariably will be waived at trial,
and that there is no valid reason for postponing the time of
waiver until trial. Consequently, the privilege should not be
recognized during the pretrial period. However, it is clear that a
personal injury action can be successfully prosecuted without
waiving the privilege.2 2 Secondly, it is clear that plaintiff's
tactical advantage of postponing the time of waiver until trial
was created by the legislature. However, the court, without
acknowledging the legislative origin, dismissed the privilege by
characterizing it as a possible obstacle to the pursuit of truth and
of no purpose.
The holding of the instant case,23 however, is novel and has
several important ramifications. While numerous commentators
have advocated the position that commencement of a personal
injury action should always constitute waiver of the privilege,24
and several states have accomplished this result by statute,25
prior cases only accelerated waiver when it became clear that
the privilege must eventually be waived.26 Also, under prior
Co., 40 F.R.D. 14 (N.D. Ohio 1966) the court modified the Mariner case
so that the privilege would be waived unless the plaintiff submitted his
written intention not to waive the privilege.
22. E.g., Boyd v. Wrisley, 228 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mich. 1964);
Ostrowski v. Mockridge, 242 Minn. 265, 65 N.W.2d 185 (1954).
23. Although the issue was framed in general terms, the majority
actually held:
We are convinced that a rigid enforcement of the privilege under
the facts of this case would serve no useful purpose and might
result in injustice. We accordingly hold that the plaintiffs in
this personal injury action waived the physician-patient privi-
lege by the commencement of the action to the extent that at-
tending physicians may be required to testify on pretrial deposi-
tion with respect to the injuries sued upon.
416 P.2d at 10.
24. See 8 WIGmORE § 2389. Wigmore argues that:
The whole reason for the privilege is the patient's supposed
unwillingness that the ailment should be disclosed to the world
at large; hence the bringing of a suit in which the very declara-
tion, and much more the proof, discloses the ailment to the
world at large, is of itself an indication that the supposed re-
pugnancy to disclosure does not exist.
Ibid.
25. See note 17 supra.
26. See, e.g., Greene v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 40 F.R.D. 14 (N.D.
Ohio 1966); Mariner v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 202 F. Supp.
430 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., 12 App. Div. 2d
44, 208 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1960). Two cases have held that commencement
of an action constitutes waiver, but they are without support and have
been subsequently ignored. Van Heuverzwyn v. State, 206 Misc. 896,
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decisions a plaintiff, upon determination that the privilege would
have to be waived, could either abandon suit or waive the privi-
lege.27  The instant case provides no such alternative for the
privilege is waived by commencing the action. This difference
becomes significant if the action is subsequently dismissed and
plantiff's medical condition is relevant in some later case. The
privilege may be lost,28 and, contrary to the policy behind the
privilege, confidential information would be used against the pa-
tient without his consent.
Another ramification of the instant case, although similar to
all decisions which accelerate the time of waiver, is the effect of
making plaintiff's evidence available during pretrial discovery.
The permissible scope of discovery is much wider than that
allowed by the rules of evidence. Thus information privileged
under the statute and irrelevant at trial may be revealed. The
opportunity to reveal this information could be used as a threat
to coerce plaintiff into abandoning the action; 29 or the informa-
tion actually obtained, but irrelevant to the injuries sued upon,
could be used to give the defendant an improper advantage,
such as causing the plaintiff to appear to be a hypochondriac.30
The instant case has also created a new dilemma. Because
the holding does not set out any real standards as to the scope
of waiver, either there will be unrestricted waiver as to all
medical information, even remotely connected with the injur-
ies sued upon, or the trial court will have to utilize a pretrial
conference to determine the scope of waiver. The former al-
ternative is unthinkable, for it would allow needless invasions
of plaintiff's privacy, and would go far beyond what has for-
merly been the scope of any waiver. Furthermore, because the
134 N.Y.S.2d 922 (Ct. Cl. 1954) (personal injury); Eder v. Cashin, 281
App. Div. 456, 120 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1953) (wrongful death).
Courts have generally been unwilling to abrogate the statutory
privilege, feeling that this is best left to the legislature. E.g., Boyd v.
Wrisley, 228 F. Supp. 9 (W.D. Mich. 1964); Polin v. Saint Paul Union
Depot Co., 159 Minn. 410, 199 N.W. 87 (1924); Kime v. Niemann, 64
Wash. 2d 394, 391 P.2d 955 (1964).
27. See Greene v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.; Mariner v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co.; Kriger v. Holland Furnace Co., supra note 26. In
these cases the ruling of waiver was prospective.
28. Once the privileged information has been revealed, the courts
hold that there is no interest to be protected and that the privilege is
waived. Clifford v. Denver & R.G.F.R.R., 188 N.Y. 349, 80 N.E. 1094
(1907).
29. Cf. Independent Prods. Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
30. Cf. Eder v. Cashin, 281 App. Div. 456, 120 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1953).
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injuries would be alleged in general terms,31 there would have
to be a full hearing to determine what injuries would ac-
tually be alleged at trial.
If such a pretrial conference is necessary, it is difficult to
understand what has been accomplished by this case. The
Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure already provide for a pretrial
conference.32 This conference seems ideally suited to deal with
the physician-patient privilege. Here the judge has the power to
force the parties to prepare their cases and determine what evi-
dence they wish to present. Because of the plenary powers given
him, the judge may stipulate that information may be revealed at
the conference without waiving the privilege. Thus, after hear-
ing all the evidence, he would be in the best position to deter-
mine whether or not it would be equitable to allow the plaintiff
to maintain the privilege until trial, and if not, to what extent
the privilege has to be waived. At this point plaintiff would
have to determine whether to abandon the suit, or waive the
privilege as to the required information. At trial, plaintiff would
be bound by this determination and could not introduce previ-
ously protected evidence.83
Finally, it is difficult to accept the proposition that it is
solely for the court to decide whether or not to recognize the
physician-patient privilege. Under prior decisions there were
standards by which it was determined whether the privilege
had to be waived, and there was some point at which plaintiff
had the choice either to drop the suit or to waive the privilege.
No such standards are provided by the instant case, since the
privilege will always be waived, and no such choice is left to
plaintiff, except the initial determination to commence an
action. Thus, both the discretionary and voluntary aspects of
waiver have been removed, making the practical effect of this
decision the abrogation of the statutory privilege. No language
in the statute warrants the interpretation that the physician-
patient privilege does not apply to personal injury actions.34
31. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 8(a), which is similar to FsD. R. Civ. P. 8(a),
calls for a simple, concise, and direct statement of the claim. This,
when viewed in conjunction with the FED. R. Civ. P., ILLusTRATIVE
FoRMs 9 & 10, indicates that the pleadings provide insufficient informa-
tion for this determination.
32. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 16, which is similar to FED. R. CIV. P. 16
but much more specific in articulating the pretrial procedure.
33. Ibid.
34. ALASKA R. Civ. P. 43 (h) (4): Physician-Patient Privilege. A
physician or surgeon shall not, against the objection of his patient, be
examined in a civil action or proceeding as to any information acquired
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Consequently, the instant case raises the question of the re-
spective roles of the judiciary and the legislature. This question
is of particular importance here because of the controversy re-
garding the merits of the privilege.35 In defense of the privilege it
is argued that a patient, compelled by the desire to preserve his
physical well-being, involuntarily reveals to his physician facts
about himself which he may not wish to disclose. Since the right
to talk freely and to allow unlimited physical examination is
essential to a therapeutic relationship, it is a value to be fos-
tered.36 In opposition to the privilege it is argued that the privi-
lege does not promote good health or protect a patient where he
needs it most-out of court37-and that the privilege allows a
patient to conceal his true physical condition while putting it at
issue in court.38 In a conflict requiring the balancing of the pub-
lic's medical welfare and the desire for the unhindered pursuit
of truth, the resolution should be based upon factual evidence
and value judgments, both of which are better left to the legis-
lature.
Trade Regulation: Proof of "Section of the Country"
Not Necessary Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act
The Government brought an action against the Pabst Brew-
ing Company charging that its acquisition of the Blatz Brewing
Company violated section 7 of the Clayton Act.' The District
in attending the patient which was necessary to enable him to pre-
scribe or act for the patient.
35. See 8 WIGORE § 2380a and authorities cited therein.
36. Arizona & N.M. Ry. v. Clark, 235 U.S. 669 (1915); Edington v.
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 67 N.Y. 185 (1876); 8 WiGmooa § 2380a.
37. See note 5 supra.
38. The most frequent criticism of the physician-patient privilege
is that it allows the plaintiff to keep out of court what is undisputedly
the best testimony-that of his physician. McComwIcK § 108; 8 WIGmoRE
§ 2380a. Although this is true, application of the privilege does not
deny the court all medical testimony, since the majority of courts have
the power to require medical examinations. This physician-patient re-
lationship is not privileged since the purpose of the examination is not
treatment. Browne v. Brooke, 236 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The only
advantages the attending physician has are the confidence of the patient
and a knowledge of his past medical history.
1. [N]o corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, di-
rectly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other
share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of
the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in com-
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Court dismissed the action at the close of the Government's
case for failure to prove that Wisconsin or the three state area of
Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan was a "relevant geographic mar-
ket" in which to test the acquisition, or that the effect of the
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend
to create a monopoly in the United States, the only relevant
market.2 On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed holding that
the Government was not required to prove a particular "section
of the country." United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546 (1966). 3
At the turn of the century the structure of American in-
dustry was undergoing a major change as small firms were
merged into giant corporations. Since the Sherman Act 4 proved
ineffective in halting this movement, the public interest required
new legislation to control the increase in monopoly power and
the corresponding decrease in competition. 5 Section 7 of the
Clayton Act was enacted to prohibit certain practices which
were not unlawful as monopolistic under the Sherman Act, but
which were potential monopolies.6 Because the original provi-
sions of section 7 only prohibited capital stock acquisitions,7
it proved inadequate and was subsequently amended to include
merger by the acquisition of corporate assets." In addition to
removing this inadequacy, the wording of the statute was altered
by amending the phrase "any section or community" to read
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the
country, the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to
lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
2. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475 (E.D. Wis.
1964).
3. The Supreme Court held that the evidence was sufficient to
prove a violation of the Clayton Act under all previously alleged sec-
tions. 384 U.S. at 551-52. For a statistical analysis of the evidence
relied on by the Court, see id. at 550-51; Brief for Appellee, pp. 9-16;
Brief for Appellant, pp. 3-10.
4. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
5. See MARTIN, MERGERS AD THE CLAYTON ACT 18 (1959).
6. See S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914).
7. The original § 7 of the Clayton Act stated:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire directly
or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen
competition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired
and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such
commerce in any section or community, or tend to create a
monopoly of any line of commerce.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
8. See note 1 supra.
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"any section of the country."9  In quoting from Standard Oil
Co. v. United States,10 the Senate Report suggested that the
relevant section of the country would be "an area of effective
competition, or a trade area."" Thus, although Congress was
unwilling to provide an objective standard for determining the
appropriate section of the country,12 there is no doubt that
the concept of a relevant geographic market was intended to be
integral to the application of the section.
In prior decisions, the Court has stressed the necessity of
establishing a relevant geographic market in finding a section 7
violation. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,3 the Court
acknowledged that the legislative history behind "the deletion
of the word 'community' in the original Act's description of the
relevant geographic market" displayed Congress' concern with
the adverse effects of a merger only "in an economically signifi-
cant 'section' of the country."'14 Such a determination was
needed to provide a frame of reference: an "'area of effec-
tive competition'... determined by reference to a product mar-
ket (the 'line of commerce') and a geographic market (the 'sec-
tion of the country') . . .,"5 within which to ascertain the poten-
tial extent to which competition could be lessened. 6
While several later decisions simply assumed that a rele-
9. See note 1 supra; S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1950).
10. 337 U.S. 293 (1949) (referred to as Standard Stations).
11. The language the Senate Report quoted from Standard Stations
was that "Since it is the preservation of competition which is at stake,
the significant proportion of coverage is that within the area of effec-
tive competition. . . ." Id. at 299 n.5. S. REP. No. 1775, op. cit. supra
note 9, at 6. See Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative His-
tory, 52 COLum. L. REV. 766, 778 (1952).
12. The Senate minority view stated "the term 'any section of the
country' is not defined in the bill but would have to be determined by
the Federal Trade Commission or the court." 96 CONG. REC. 16442 (1950)
(remarks of Senator Donnell). Senator Kefauver answered this point
by stating, "the use of the term 'any section of the country' is not new
to section 7 of the Clayton Act. The present section 7 uses the termgany section or community.' It is difficult to follow an objection to a
simplification and narrowing of terms by dropping the words 'or com-
munity."' Id. at 16453. The legislative history indicates the term "in
any community" was dropped because it was feared this might go so
far as to prevent any local enterprise in a small town from buying out
another local enterprise. S. REP. No. 1775, op. cit. supra note 9, at 4.
See generally Note, Section 7 of the Clayton Act: A Legislative History
52 COLUm. L. REV. 766, 778-79 (1952).
13. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
'14. Id. at 320.
15. Id. at 324.
16. Id. at 335.
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vant geographic market had been proven,1'7 United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank's indicates that the Court has not dis-
pensed with the requirement of proving a section of the country
by showing an economically significant geographic market.19
In that case, the Court reaffirmed the geographic market analy-
sis used in Brown Shoe,20 holding that the phrase section of the
country was "not where the parties . . . do business or even
where they compete, but where, within the area of competitive
overlap, the effect of the merger on competition will be direct
and immediate."21
Consequently, it is clear that Congress envisioned, and the
courts implemented, the concept of an economically relevant
geographic market. Such terms as area of effective competi-
tion,22 area of competitive overlap,23 and economically signifi-
cant section of the country 24 were used to define the phrase any
section of the country. These terms provided a description of
an economic construct which could be related to antitrust
policy in defining a geographic market.25 Although an extremely
complex procedure,26 defining the geographic market is neces-
17. E.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 444
(1964).
18. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
19. For an examination of cases subsequent to Philadelphia Bank
giving the same indication as to proof of geographic market see, e.g.,
FTC v. Consolidated Foods, 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Con-
tinental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S.
651 (1964). But cf. Upshaw, The Relevant Market in Merger Decisions:
Antitrust Concept or Antitrust Device, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 424 (1965).
20. Contra, 77 HARV. L. REV. 159, 162 (1963).
21. 374 U.S. 321, 357.
22. E.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961);
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 299-300 n.5 (1949).
23. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357
(1963).
24. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
25. For example, the Senate Report commented on the area of
effective competition as follows:
In determining the area of effective competition for a given
product, it will be necessary to decide what comprises an ap-
preciable segment of the market. An appreciable segment of
the market may not only be a segment which covers an appre-
ciable segment of the trade, but it may also be a segment which
is largely segregated from, independent of, or not affected by
the trade in that product in other parts of the country.
S. REP. No. 1775, op. cit. supra note 9, at 6.
26. See BOCK, MERGERS AxD MARKETS 35 (1st ed. 1960); MARTIN, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 321; Hogan & Koelble, Determination of the Marketfor Antitrust Purposes: Difficulties and Problems, 39 U. DET. L.J. 519,
533 (1962); Mann & Lewyn, The Relevant Market Under Section 7 of
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sarily a major determinent of antitrust policy,27 as only within
a market context can the terms monopolization, concentration,
or competition acquire meaning.
28
Although both Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank were cited
in Pabst, these cases were neither distinguished nor expressly
overruled. The Court merely stated that "the failure . .. to
prove . . . what constitutes a relevant . . . 'geographic' market
is not an adequate ground on which to dismiss a § 7 case,"2
implying that in the future an analysis different from an eco-
nomic one will be required in establishing the section of the
country in an alleged section 7 violation.3
0
In defining a relevant geographic market, the Court should
attempt to attain two primary goals: a standard which will
provide a predictable result for businessmen contemplating mer-
ger,3 ' and one that can be administered by a court without
the Clayton Act: Two New Cases-Two Different Views, 47 VA. L. REV.
1014-15 (1961).
27. Justice Fortas recognized this in his concurring opinion in
Pabst: "It is true that the search for the relevant market is frequently
complicated and elaborated beyond reason or need-sometimes for pur-
poses of delay or obstruction. But the search is nevertheless essential.
It is not a snipe hunt." 384 U.S. at 562.
28. Hogan & Koelble, supra note 26, at 533; see KAYSEN & TURNER,
ANTITRUST POLICY 100-02 (1959). See also Stekler, Market Definitions
and the Antitrust Laws, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 741 (1964).
29. 384 U.S. at 549.
30. One article has indicated that as long as Pabst stands, geo-
graphic market determination is not an essential prerequisite in estab-
lishing a § 7 violation, but the article assumes that the concept of a
relevant geogrphic market will be resurrected. Hale & Hale, Delineating
the Geographic Market: A Problem in Merger Cases, 61 Nw. U.L. REv.
538, 540 (1966). A § 7 case decided just a few months before Pabst
indicated a Federal District Court still felt proof of a geographic mar-
ket was necessary. See United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253
F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 3161 (U.S. Nov. 8, 1966).
However, it is doubtful that Pabst was intended to be this broad.
One article has commented on Pabst as follows:
Only time and another case will tell whether the Pabst case
and its broad language has in fact so drastically changed the
law. We believe that, despite the apparent broad sweep of the
Court's language, the delineation of the geographic market
ought and will continue to be considered a factor in anti-merger
litigation ....
Hale & Hale, supra at 540.
31. One writer suggests that it is impossible to predict the prob-
able legality of a proposed merger. He feels that an extended factual
inquiry is necessary which just cannot be made prior to the merger.
Elman, The Need for Certainty and Predictability in the Application of
the Merger Law, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 613, 624 (1965). However, this
writer addressed himself to the predictability of whether a merger may
tend to lessen competition, and not to a determination of the relevant
market. If the relevant market can be predicted, it seems that under
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being overwhelmed with voluminous economic analysis.3 2 The
underlying policies of antitrust legislation must be considered
in achieving a balance between these two factors.33
The primary goal of antitrust policy is said to be the limita-
tion of market power to the extent it is not incompatible with
efficiency and progressiveness in a particular industry. 4 Al-
though this is an economic objective, it is generally accepted
that antitrust law is concerned with more than purely economic
considerations.35 In Philadelphia Bank, the Court obviously rec-
ognized that limitation of market power will not always result
in the attainment of efficiency and progressiveness in the par-
ticular industry, yet it held that an undue percentage share of
the relevant market is a violation of section 7. Since the Court
dispensed with any economic analysis concerning the effect on
efficiency and progressiveness, the fear of concentration may
well have been the Court's concern.3 6 Although it has been
said that the primary goals of antitrust law are centered on
economic considerations,3 7 it does not follow that a substantial
economic analysis is necessary in determining the relevant geo-
graphic market.
By examining prior decisions in light of the underlying pol-
icy of the antitrust laws, it is arguable that Pabst is not as
unprecedented on geographic market determination as it may
Philadelphia Bank no extended factual inquiry is then needed to deter-
mine if the proposed merger is invalid under § 7. All that must be
examined is the share of the market the merged company will have,
and whether there is a trend toward concentration in that industry.
32. See Rill, The Trend Toward Social Competition Under Section
7 of the Clayton Act, 54 GEO. L.J. 891, 898 (1966).
33. The Court should be free to accept a reasonable approach to
defining the geographic market, as apparently it has not adopted a
method yet. Instead, it has worked with a "kaleidoscope" of factors in
determining each case. Bock, The Relativity of Economic Evidence in
Merger Cases-Emerging Decisions Force the Issue, 63 VicH. L. REV.
1355, 1364-65 (1965). It has been suggested that the Court is using the
right approach when it sets up broad general terms describing the geo-
graphic market and then applies these to the economic fact considera-
tions of each case. See Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 78 HAav. L. REv. 1313, 1318-19 (1965).
34. K Ysa & TuNER, op. cit. supra note 28, at 45.
35. Rill, supra note 32, at 901.
36. 374 U.S. at 363.
37. See Bock, supra note 33, at 1355. It has also been argued that
the goal of antitrust law is to preserve an industry of small businesses.
Dean & Gustus, Vertical Integration and Section 7, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 672,
687 (1965). However, this type of discrimination is improper under
antitrust policy. Antitrust law is not intended to protect an inefficient
small businessman. Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Anti-
trust Policy, 65 CoL.ni L. REV. 422, 439 (1965).
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appear. Brown Shoe and Philadelphia Bank when read together
seem to suggest that the greater the concentration in the indus-
try, the smaller the relevant geographic market is found to be.38
The Court is apparently willing to bend the relevant geographic
market to obtain the desired result.3 9 By stating in Pabst
that no proof of a relevant geographic market is required, the
Court seems concerned solely with the fear of concentration
in our economy.
40
Although Pabst could be read as eliminating the need to
prove a geographic market, it is more reasonable to suggest that
the Court is merely attempting to obviate the necessity of a
complex economic analysis. If the chief concern of Congress is
to stem the increase of anticompetitive concentration,41 the focal
point in the determination of the market share should be the
ease of entry into a geographic area of an industry. Since an
industry which is easy to enter is in little danger of anticompeti-
tive concentration, it would appear that the relevant geographic
market could be delineated by an entry-blocking determination.4 2
This is the position enunciated by Justice Harlan in his concur-
ring opinion. 43 No comprehensive economic data would be nec-
essary. If transportation costs, the need for vast initial expendi-
tures, product images, or other factors effectively impede the
entry of new competitors, a definable area of competition may
be established.44
38. See Bock, supra note 33, at 1359. If the relevant geographic
market is defined narrowly enough, a case such as Philadelphia Bank
is an easy one. See Bock, supra note 33, at 1359; Rill, supra note 32, at
904.
39. See Cook, Merger Law and Big Business: A Look Ahead, 40
N.Y.U.L. REV. 710, 712 (1965); Rill, supra note 32, at 905.
40. See Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 CoLum. L. REV.
377, 383 (1965); Cook, supra note 39, at 713.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1949); S. REP.
No. 1775, op. cit. supra note 9, at 3; 96 CONG. REc. 16433-36 (1950)
(remarks of Senator O'Connor); id. at 16450 (remarks of Senator
Kefauver); 95 CONG. REc. 11485-86 (1949) (remarks of Congressman
Celler).
42. It must be remembered that entry blocking does not neces-
sarily lessen competition, but that it is its potential to do so which
makes it bad. See Blake & Jones, supra note 37, at 444. Also, the mere
possibility of a merger with a firm already in the market lowers the
entry barriers significantly. KAYSEN & TunNEI, op. cit. supra note 28,
at 128.
43. See 384 U.S. at 555.
44. Some of the things Justice Harlan considered in determining
economic barriers for the State of Wisconsin included: (1) most of the
beer sold in Wisconsin was produced locally-the same beer could be
sold in different states at different prices; (2) marketing techniques were
such that out of state brewers were at a competitive disadvantage; (3)
[Vol. 51:582
CASE COMMENTS
It is clear that the standards to be applied in defining "any
section of the country" must be enunciated by the courts.45
Pabst does not seem to provide an effective approach to this
problem, although the removal of the necessity of complex eco-
nomic analysis is a beginning. The solution suggested by Jus-
tice Harlan goes further in providing a relatively predictable
and easily administrable method of analysis.
distributing networks are set up on a statewide basis; and, (4) state alco-
holic beverage laws governed the state area as a unit. 384 U.S. at 558-
60. See also Hale & Hale, supra note 30, at 551-53.
45. Blake & Jones, supra note 40, at 399-400. The Court may again
face the issue when another case involving proof of the relevant sec-
tion of the country comes up on appeal. United States v. National Steel
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Tex. 1965), appeal docketed, 35 U.S.L.
WEa 3006 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1965) (No. 789, 1965 term; renumbered No. 31,
1966 term).
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